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Constitutional Law: United States v. Morrison: The
Gender Motivated Violence Act Takes a Beating by the
Supreme Court's New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
In enacting the VAWA, Congress recognized the degree to which our
nation's systems of law enforcement and adjudication have been
complicit in perpetuating the epidemic of violence against women.'
L Introduction
This statement, taken from a Tenth Circuit case allowing female victims to state
a cause of action2 under the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA),3 expresses
Congress's crucial realization that state courts needed assistance in combating
violence against women. The victims in this Tenth Circuit case celebrated a victory;
however, their victory was short lived. A recent Supreme Court decision, United
States v. Morrison,4 struck down the GMVA as an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional Commerce Clause power. Thus, the Tenth Circuit case above, as well
as others like it, will be overturned and the female victims will remain without
vindication.' The Tenth Circuit case provides an example of the effect that
Morrison, the subject of this note, will have not only on the GMVA, but also on
different types of future legislation. The Morrison decision severely limits
Congress's ability to regulate areas such as civil rights and the environment under
its commerce power. It also indicates a reversion to unsuccessful, antiquated, preNew Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
In analyzing Morrison and its repercussions, this note addresses the following
topics: Part II provides a brief history of Supreme Court Commerce Clause

1. McCann v. Rosquist, 185 F.3d 1113, 1120 (10th Cir. 1999).
2. Id. (reversing the district court's decision that the plaintiffs did not state a cause of action under
the GMVA and remanding to district court).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). The Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA) provided victims
of gender-motivated violence, such as rape and domestic abuse, a civil remedy in federal courts. The
GMVA was a section of the larger Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994),
passed by Congress in 1994. For a detailed explanation of other sections of the VAWA and an in-depth
look at the civil remedy portion of the statute, see Leonard Karp & Lauren Belleau, FederalLaw and
Domestic Violence: The Legacy of the Violence Against Women Act, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW
173 (1999), and Daniel G. Atkins et al., Strivingfor Justice with the Violence Against Women Act and
Civil Tort Actions, 14 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 69 (1999).
4. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

5. In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit eventually affirmed the district court's original
dismissal of the action based on the Supreme Court's invalidation of the GMVA. McCann v. Rosquist,
No. 98-4049, 2001 WL 686787, at *1 (10th Cir. June 19, 2001).
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jurisprudence, brief because the Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopeze
spawned numerous articles on the commerce power.' Part III provides extensive
background on Morrison, including a statement of the facts, a summary of the lower
court decisions, and an explanation of the majority and dissenting positions. Part IV
articulates four major flaws in the Morrison majority opinion: (1) purporting to
adhere to rationality review, while applying a stricter form of scrutiny; (2) refusing
to acknowledge the purpose of the GMVA as protecting civil rights; (3) viewing the
GMVA as an infringement on states' rights; and (4) failing to sufficiently consider
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the GMVA.
Part V discusses several types of statutes that have been and will continue to be
challenged as a result of the Morrison decision. These include various federal
possession statutes, the Hobbs Act, the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act,
the Federal Arbitration Act, the Child Support Recovery Act, the Fair Housing
Administration Act, the Free Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and environmental
regulations. Part V provides practitioners assistance in analyzing the
constitutionality of statutes after Morrison, compiling several recent cases from
various jurisdictions. At the same time, Part V illustrates that Morrison places
several types of desirable legislation in jeopardy. Part VI concludes with an
argument that Lopez and Morrison should be overruled, and the Court should return
to pre-Lopez reasoning.
I. Supreme Court Decisions Leading to Morrison
A. Pre-Lopez: A Long Road of Legislative Deference
As the United States evolved from a community-oriented, agricultural economy
to a national, industrialized economy, the Supreme Court granted Congress
increased power to pass federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. Much of
this federal regulation arose as New Deal legislation intended to strengthen and
federalize the national economy." In a breakthrough case, National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,0 the Supreme Court abandoned its former
adherence to a "rigid model of tiered federalism and... instead [began to] focus
on assessing the proper scope of Congress's ability to regulate an economy that was
interrelated and national in nature."" In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court

6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the FederalCommerce Power andIncidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 533 (1995); Symposium, The New FederalismAfter
United States v. Lopez, 46 CAsE W. RFs. L.REv. 633 (1995); Barry C. Toone & Bradley J. Wiskirchen,
Note, Great Expectations: The Illusion of Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 22 J. LEGIS. 241
(1996).
8. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[to regulate Commerce... among
the several states." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
9. Parker Douglas, Note, The Violence Against Women Act and ContemporaryCommerce Power:
PrincipledRegulation and the Concerns of Federalism, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 703, 713.
10. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
11. Douglas, supra note 9, at 713.
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overruled former decisions holding that regulation under the Commerce Clause must
have a direct link to interstatecommerce; instead, the Court held that Congress had
the ability to regulate intrastate activities if these activities had 'a close and
substantialrelation to interstate commerce.'"' 2 This new test allowed Congress to
pass legislation that would have formerly been viewed as purely local and beyond
the reach of federal regulation."
The test articulated in Jones & Laughlin Steel became known as the "substantial
effects test" and remained the benchmark for deciding Commerce Clause issues for
approximately sixty years.'4 Under the substantial effects test, numerous congressional acts passed constitutional muster despite their indirect and arguably negligible
effect on interstate commerce, thus proving the Court's grant of deference to
Congress's exercise of its commerce power.'" Often cited as the high watermark
of the substantial effects test and often used to demonstrate the wide range of
commerce power over what may appear a purely local activity is the Court's
decision in Wickard v. Filburn.16 In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, a New Deal provision that allowed the
Secretary of Agriculture to set quotas for raising wheat on all farms within the
United States."7 A private farmer contested the statute, arguing that it was
unconstitutional because it regulated a noneconomic, local activity - the home
growing of wheat used solely for self-consumption." The Court rejected this
argument and held that although the activity had only a trivial effect on interstate
commerce when considered individually, it had a sufficiently substantial effect on
interstate commerce when considered in the aggregate. 9 Wickard developed a
"cumulative effect principle" that further enlarged congressional power under the
substantial effects test."
The Court has applied the Wickard rationale and the substantial effects test not
only to economic regulation, but also to civil rights legislation passed under the
Commerce Clause.' In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,2 the Court

12. See id at 713-14 (emphasis added).
13. See id at 714.
14. See Bradley A. Harsch, Brzonkala, Lopez, and the Commerce Clause Canard:A Synthesis of
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,29 N.M. L. REV. 321, 325 (1999) (criticizing the substantial effects
test for being overinclusive).
15. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va.Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding
environmental regulation); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding loan-sharking
regulation); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding regulation of home-grown wheat);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the setting of maximum hour and minimum
wage laws).
16. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17. Id at 113-15.
18. Id at 119.

19. Id. at 127-29.
20. See Douglas, supra note 9, at 714.
21. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964).

22. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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upheld Title IIof the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prevented places of public
accommodation from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, or
religion. In Heart of Atlanta, the Court acknowledged that the fundamental
objective behind Title II was to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that
accompanies inequality.' Acknowledging this noneconomic objective, the Court
recognized that such an objective could be readily achieved by congressional action
based on Commerce Clause power.' Significantly, the Court focused on the
'
and gave great deference to
regulation's relation to the "national interest,"
Congress: "'The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this,
They are the restraints on
as in many other instances .. the sole restraints
The Court reasoned that
which the people must often rely solely . .
Congress's regulatory power was not restricted simply because the particular
obstruction to interstate commerce with which it dealt (discrimination) was deemed
a moral and social wrong.' The Court also considered the argument that Title II
regulated purely local activity, but reasoned that the commerce power "includes the
power to regulate the local incidents. . . which might have a substantial and
harmful effect upon that commerce.""
Because the statute at issue in Morrison stated its purpose as ending
discriminatory violence against women (arguably making it a civil rights statute),"
the Court's rationale in Heart of Atlanta deserves particular attention. As will be
explained in Part IV.B of this note, the Morrisonmajority ignored Heart of Atlanta's
rationale for upholding civil rights laws under the commerce power. Instead, the
Court strictly followed Lopez, despite the fact that the GMVA had more in common
with the Civil Rights Act at issue in Heart of Atlanta than the Gun Free School
Zones Act at issue in Lopez.
B. United States v. Lopez: A Screeching Halt
In 1995, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark Commerce Clause
decision of United States v. Lopez,3 which signaled a drastic departure from prior
jurisprudence, reminded Congress that its regulatory powers were limited, and
sparked mass debate in the legal community. In Lopez, the Court determined the

23. Id. at 247.
24. Id. at 250.
25. Id.

26. Id. at 255 (emphasis added).

27. Id.
28. Id. at 257.
29. Id. at 258 (emphasis added). This is significant because the Morrison majority ignored this
expansive, inclusive language when interpreting the GMVA. See infra Part IV.B.
30. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 629 (2000); see also infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
31. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Lopez court decided the case by a narrow margin. The opinion
consisted of a tenuous three-Justice majority, supported by two concurring opinions, and opposed by a
four-Justice dissent. Id.
32. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act (GFSZA), a statute making it
a federal crime for "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
the individual knows . . . is a school zone." 3 The Lopez Court delineated three
categories of activity that Congress may regulate: (1) the use of channels of
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.' The Lopez and Morrison
analyses apply to category-three legislation; category three stands on the most
tenuous ground and will be the subject of most scholarly debate on this topic."
In scrutinizing category-three legislation, the Court posited four considerations
relevant to determining whether a statute meets constitutional standards: (1) whether
the regulated activity is commercial or noncommercial in nature; (2) whether the
statute contains a jurisdictional nexus tying it to interstate commerce;36 (3) whether
Congress made sufficient legislative findings to support a rational basis for
concluding commerce would be substantially affected by the regulation; and (4)
whether the link between the conduct and the effect on interstate commerce is
attenuated. Although the Court did not expressly overrule precedent, by adding
these four more restrictive and newly categorical considerations to a Commerce
Clause analysis, the Court quietly but drastically changed the course of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Finding that "[r]espondent was a local student at a local
school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce,
and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie

33. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
34. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
35. In Part V, this note examines controversial statutes that have been challenged after Morrison.
Most courts categorized the controversial piece of legislation as category-three legislation, that which
potentially has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See infra Part V.
36. A "jurisdictional nexus" serves as a narrowing element within a statute that theoretically ensures,
on a case-by-case basis, that the instance of regulated conduct had an effect on interstate commerce. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. For example, to correct the GFSZA after the Lopez decision, Congress merely
added a provision that the gun must have "moved in or... otherwise affect[ed] interstate or foreign
commerce" and then noted the common movement of guns in interstate commerce. See Douglas, supra
note 9, at 747 n.319. In addition, other portions of the VAWA that contain a jurisdictional nexus have
been upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases
that have upheld the portion of the VAWA prohibiting interstate domestic violence due to its
jurisdictional nexus).
One author, arguing in favor of the GMVA's constitutionality, reasoned that "[t]he jurisdictional nexus
is best interpreted as an alternative avenue to constitutionality rather than as a requirement. That the civil
rights provision of VAWA contains no such jurisdictional element, therefore, does not constitute a
shortcoming." Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The
Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1934
(1996). Further, Maloney argues that adding a jurisdictional nexus to the GMVA would be "highly
impractical and counterproductive. Would the question be whether the perpetrator or the victim recently
moved in interstate commerce? If so, the efficacy of the remedy would be undercut." Id. at 1935.
37. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-63. These four considerations formed the basis of the majority
opinion. But Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Conner, implied a reluctance to
move away from anything stricter than a rational basis test: "Whatever the judicial role, it is axiomatic
that Congress does have substantial discretion and control over the federal balance." Id. at 577 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
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to interstate commerce,"' the Court struck down federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause for the first time in sixty years. 9
The Lopez decision did not expressly overrule precedent such as Wickard and
Heartof Atlanta, and Congress did not back the GFSZA with congressional findings
linking the regulation to interstate commerce. ' Thus, the decision left legal
scholars wondering whether the case would be an anomaly in the long line of
commerce cases, a slap on the wrist reminding Congress to sufficiently link its
regulation to interstate commerce with legislative findings, or a true turning point
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence' While Morrison does not answer the deeper,
underlying questions raised by Lopez and still does not explicitly announce a new
test for Commerce Clause regulation, Morrison does make two points very clear.
First, Lopez will not stand as an anomaly. Second, Lopez served as more than a
reminder to Congress to provide ample evidence backing the regulation's link to
interstate commerce. The Morrisonopinion indicates that Lopez served as a warning
that the Supreme Court would now be in the business of judicially scrutinizing the
sufficiency, logic, and soundness of the evidence provided by Congress.
I11. United States v. Morrison: A Turn in the Wrong Direction
A. Christy Brzonkala's Story
In May 2000, the Supreme Court handed down the long-awaited and muchdebated follow-up case to Lopez, United States v. Morrison. 2 Morrisonarose from
the following facts: Christy Brzonkala attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University. On the third floor of her college dormitory, two university football
players allegedly gang raped Christy after meeting her earlier in the evening.!
After the incident, the accused made derogatory statements about getting women
drunk and having sex with them." Two months later, Christy filed a report against

38. Id. at 567.
39. Because the dissent in Morrison in many ways echoes the dissent in Lopez, the dissent's position
in Lopez will be illuminated in Part IV of this note. For a further discussion of the dissents position in
Lopez, see Harsch, supra note 14, arguing that the Lopez majority endorsed an underinclusive test, that
the Lopez dissent endorsed an overinclusive test, and offering his own four-prong test for Commerce
Clause analysis.
40. The GFSZA did not require the gun to have traveled in interstate commerce. In addition,
Congress did not make any findings linking guns in school to interstate commerce. See Douglas, supra
note 9, at 717.
41. See generally Symposium, The New FederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 633 (1995); Regan, supra note 7; Toone & Wiskirchen, supranote 7.
42. 529 U.S. 598 (2000), affig sub nom. Brzonkala v. Va.Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. (Brzonkala
II), 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'gen banc Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.
(Brzonkala II), 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'g Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.
(Brzonkala I), 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (striking the statute as unconstitutional).
43. Morrison allegedly forced Brzonkala into intercourse three different times. Peter J. Liuzzo,
Comment, Brzonkaa v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University: The Constitutionalityof the Violence
Against Women Act - Recognizing that Violence Targeted at Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63
BROOK. L. Rsv. 367, 375 (1997).
44. Specifically, the plaintiff introduced the following statement at trial as evidence of Morrison's
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her two attackers with the university.4' After a committee hearing, the panel found
Antonio Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for one year; the
panel released the other attacker due to insufficient evidence. Morrison appealed
this decision and the committee set aside Morrison's suspension, allowing him to
return to campus the following semester. After learning of the panel's decision from
a newspaper article, Christy decided not to return to school, fearing for her safety
due to Morrison's return and the publicity engendered by her accusations. Later that

year, Christy filed suit in federal court in Virginia, alleging violations of various
state laws, Title IX of the Education Amendment Act, and the VAWA. 47
B. Summary of Lower Court Decisions, with Focus on Vacated Fourth Circuit

Opinion
Three relevant decisions came down in this case: the district court decision," a
Fourth Circuit opinion, 9 and a Fourth Circuit en banc rehearing opinion." The
district court decision and en banc opinion struck down the statute as unconstitutional, while the Fourth Circuit's vacated decision upheld the statute. All

three opinions reflect the underlying ideological split in the Supreme Court in both
the Lopez and Morrisondecisions. Because the en banc court's decision bears much

similarity to the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Morrison" (discussed in the
next section), this portion of the note analyzes the original Fourth Circuit opinion

gender animus: "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." See id. at 376. The vulgar and
discriminatory statement by Morrison was crucial because the GMVA required that the violent act be
motivated by gender animus. See Atkins et al., supra note 3 (offering practical advice on how to
prosecute under the Violence Against Women Act and explaining the difficulty in proving the gendermotivated-animus element of the statute).
45. Brzonkala did not file criminal charges because, as in many rape cases, she had not preserved
any physical evidence. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 954 (4th Cir.
1997).
46. The university did not notify Brzonkala of the appeal proceedings or the judgement set aside
by the school. See Liuzzo, supra note 43, at 376.
47. Brzonkala never finished college and now works as a waitress. Throughout this ordeal, she
overdosed on pills and became reclusive, according to her father. Asked about the outcome of her case
(which, confusingly, ended up having nothing to do with what happened to her that night), Christy said:
I fell in a big black hole, and this is where the rabbit ends up. It was disappointment after
disappointment ....I cry whenever I think about how much I wish it would have been
the other way, to have tangible evidence that we're making progress toward men and
women being equal.
Brooke A. Masters, 'No Winners' in Rape Lawsuit; Two Students Forever Changed by Case That Went
to Supreme Court, WASHINGTON POST, May 20, 2000, at BI.
48. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. (Brzonkala 1), 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.
1996).
49. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. (Brzonkala II), 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Luttig, J., dissenting) (upholding GMVA).
50. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. (Brzonkala III), 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)
(Niemeyer, J.,
concurring) (Motz, J., dissenting) (striking down GMVA as unconstitutional).
51. For an in-depth prediction of and precursor to the Morrisondecision, see Brzonkala 111,
a sixtynine page opinion detailing the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its relation to Lopez.
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authored by Judge Motz. Judge Motz's opinion illuminates and supports several
arguments made in Part IV, arguing for the constitutionality of the GMVA.
The original Fourth Circuit opinion, vacated by the en banc opinion, upholds the
statute, distinguishing Morrison from Lopez based on the voluminous congressional
findings behind the GMVA in comparison to the absence of congressional findings
behind the GFSZA." The court stated that it could "begin where the Lopez Court
could not, by 'evaluat[ing] the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce."'" The court held that it must defer to
congressional findings when a rational basis exists for such findings.' Applying
this rational basis test (relying on language from Lopez), the court found a rational
basis for Congress's conclusion that the GMVA substantially affected interstate
commerce based on Congress's "exhaustive and meticulous investigation of the
problem."55 Specifically, the court cited a Senate report stating the following:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse
effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate
business . . . and in places involved, in interstate commerce . . . by
diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs,
and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.'
In addition, the court cited cases from every judicial circuit that upheld post-Lopez
Commerce Clause challenges using a rational basis test,' as well as cases
upholding the GMVA under Commerce Clause challenges.5 '
Significantly, the court interpreted Lopez in the following way: "The Lopez court
did not strike down [the GFSZA] because it regulated non-economic activity. The
Court invalidated [the GFSZA] because neither Congress nor the Government
convinced the Court that there was a rational basis for concluding that possession
of a gun in a school zone substantially affected interstate commerce."" In contrast,
according to Judge Motz, Congress's legislative findings that women's decreased
workplace productivity and decreased interstate travel substantially affected
interstate commerce must convince the court of a rational basis behind the GMVA.
This opinion demonstrates the difficult task that Lopez (and now Morrison)
demands: courts must attempt to apply the rational basis test of old, while at the
same time adhere to the stricter, more categorical approach mandated by Lopez and

52. See Brzonkala II, 132 F.3d at 965.
53. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995)).
54. Id. at 966 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
55. Id. at 967.
56. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991)).
57. Id. at 968 n. 11. For a Tenth Circuit case applying a post-Lopez rational basis analysis, see
United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996),
58. Brzonkala II, 132 F.3d at 968. Two cases - Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa
1997), and Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) - provide the most illustrative examples of
cases upholding the GMVA.
59. Brzonkala II,132 F.3d at 972.
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Morrison. However, these two approaches cannot coexist to form a workable
Commerce Clause standard. Legitimately and probably somewhat hopefully, Judge
Motz interpreted Lopez as a judicial slap on the wrist to force Congress to better
explain the law's tie to interstate commerce, rather than a brand new form of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison, Judge Motz interpreted Lopez incorrectly.
C. The Morrison Majority
Some scholars correctly predicted, based on the Court's decision in Lopez, that
the Supreme Court would strike down the GMVA as an unconstitutional exertion
of Commerce Clause power.' By invalidating the GMVA, the Court not only
solidified the importance of Lopez as a turning point in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, but also extended the reach and rationale of the Lopez decision to
statutes sufficiently supported by congressional findings. Writing for a stronger fiveJustice majority than in Lopez,6 Chief Justice Rehnquist tracked the three
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause, and
categorized the VAWA as category-three legislation, that which has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.' The Court then proceeded with a Lopez analysis,
describing Lopez as the most recent clarification of category-three regulation.
First, the Court emphasized that "the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct
at issue" in Lopez "was central to [its] decision in that case,"" and concluded that
gender-motivated crimes of violence do not qualify as economic activity.' The
Court purportedto refuse to adopt a "categorical rule against aggregating the effects
of a noneconomic activity," but did emphasize that intrastate Commerce Clause
regulation had only been upheld when that activity was economic in nature.' (In
effect, Morrison does seem to adopt a ,categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of a noneconomic activity.) Second, the Court noted the lack of a

60. See Lisa A. Carroll, Comment, Women's Powerless Tool: How Congress Overreached the
Constitution with the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 30 . MARSHALL L. REy.
803 (1997) (predicting the Supreme Court would find the GMVA unconstitutional).
61. Lopez, also a 5-4 split, had a Kennedy-O'Conner concurrence expressing doubts regarding
content-based limits on the Commerce Clause power. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568-83
(1995). Morrison had only a short, one-Justice concurrence by Justice Thomas, thus indicating Justice
Kennedy's and Justice O'Conner's more solid agreement with the Morrison analysis. See United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). Notably, Justice Thomas would have extended Lopez a step
further and explicitly overruled the substantial effects test. See id.
62. Petitioners did not contend that the GMVA fell within either of the first two categories of
Commerce Clause regulation. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609. However, at least one article makes the
argument that the GMVA could also be categorized as category-two regulation, a regulation of "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce." Maloney, supra
note 36, at 1935-39 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
63. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609. Although the Court labeled Lopez as a "clarification" of the
substantial effects analysis, Lopez arguably departed from, rather than clarified, established precedent on
category-three regulation.
64. Id. at 610.
65. Id. at 613.
66. Ild.
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jurisdictional element in the GMVA and reasoned that a jurisdictional element may
have saved the statute.67 Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Court dismissed

the numerous congressional findings as unpersuasive because the findings relied on
the type of weak, but-for causal reasoning that Lopez explicitly rejected." In other
words, the link between the occurrence of the crime and the effects on interstate
commerce was too attenuated. The Court also reiterated its fear that Congress may

begin regulating any crime, as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that
crime had substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption."
The Court also feared federal infringement on family law and other traditional areas
of state regulation." Concluding, the Court rejected the argument that Congress
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's
aggregate effect on interstate commerce, and held that the Constitution required a
distinction between what is "truly national" and what is "truly local."'"
D. The Morrison Dissent
Four Justices dissented in Morrison.' The dissent began by stating, "The
business of the courts is to review fhe congressional assessment, not for soundness

but simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in
fact.""3 First, the dissent explained why the GMVA should be upheld, using Lopez
as controlling precedent. Like Judge Motz, the dissent distinguished Lopez from
Morrison based on the "mountain of data" assembled by Congress before passing
the GMVA.74 The dissent then pointed to cases such as Heart of Atlanta'5 and
Katzenbach v. McClung" in which the Court upheld similar legislation based on

much less congressional evidence.' The dissent also recognized that gender-based

67. Id. The Court noted that Congress elected to cast the GMVA's remedy "over a wider, and more
purely intrastate, body of crime." Id. The Court ignored the fact that adding ajurisdictional nexus would
render this type of statute virtually useless. See Maloney, supra note 36, at 1935 (arguing that such an
element would be highly impractical and counterproductive to the purposes of the GMVA).
68. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
69. Id. at 615.
70. Id. at 615-16.
71. Id. at 617-18. The majority also rejected passage of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment
because the GMVA did not directly apply to state actors. Id. at 626-27. The dissent does not reach this
issue because of its finding of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. The Fourteenth
Amendment's application to the GMVA and other statutes will be discussed in Part IV.D of this note.
72. Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.
Id. at 628-55. Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Stevens joined, and with
whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg joined as to Part I-A. Id. at 655-66.
73. Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 277 (1981)).
74. Id. Significantly, Congress passed the VAWA before the Lopez decision and yet made detailed
findings regarding the effects on interstate commerce.
75. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
76. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
77. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Heart of Atlanta, the Court upheld the
statute despite its lack of congressional findings tying the regulation to interstate commerce. Heart of
Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252.
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violence in the 1990s operated similarly to racial discrimination in the 1960s in
reducing the mobility of employees and their consumption of goods in interstate
commerce. Like racial discrimination, the dissent reasoned, gender-based violence
bars its most likely targets from full participation in the national economy."
Second, the dissent explained that the new Commerce Clause test pronounced in
Lopez and now affirmed in Morrison cannot be reconciled with precedent: it grants
Congress less than plenary power and represents a resurgence of the disastrous preNew Deal approach of categorical limitation to Commerce Clause analysis.' The
dissent also criticized the majority for failing to utilize the benefit of hindsight, for
failing to acknowledge the "near-tragedy" that stemmed from distinguishing in terms
of commercial and noncommercial activity for purposes of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.' Applying Wickard, the dissent reasoned,
[If substantial effects on commerce are proper subjects of concern
under the Commerce Clause, what difference should it make whether
the causes of those effects are themselves commercial? The Court's
answer is that it makes a difference to federalism, and the Court's new
judicially derivedfederalism is the crux of our disagreement."t
This statement by the dissent labels the majority's brand of federalism as judicially
created rather than constitutionally mandated. In many ways, this statement sums
up the ideological Commerce Clause debate that currently splits the Court.
IV. Analysis: The Majority Steered Wrong in Four Ways
A. The Majority Did Not Take a Stand Between the Rational Basis Test and the
Higher Level of Judicial Scrutiny Established in Lopez
The majority purports to rely on pre-Lopez case law and pays "lip service" to the
rational basis test as a standard for scrutinizing Commerce Clause legislation, while
at the same time applying an obviously higher standard of review. Comparing
language in Morrison with pre-Lopez precedent such as Wickard and Heart of
Atlanta, Morrison clearly applied a standard other than rational basis review.
Because the GFSZA had no legislative findings and did not even mention
commerce,' the Court in Lopez more legitimately may have been adhering to
rationality review, and yet failing to find a rational basis." In contrast, Congress
78. See Morrison,529 U.S. at 636 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No 103-138, at 54 (1993)).
79. Id. at 640-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 641-42 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned:
Since adherence to these formalistically contrived confines of commerce power in large
measure provoked the judicial crisis of 1937, one might reasonably have doubted that
Members of this Court would ever again toy with a return to the days before [Jones &
Laughlin Steel], which brought the earlier and nearly disastrous experiment to an end.
Id. at 642-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 643 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
82. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,562 (1995) (explaining that the government conceded
that the GFSZA did not contain congressional findings regarding its effects on interstate commerce).
83. Significantly, Lopez did have a four-Justice dissent, which would have upheld the statute based
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backed the GMVA with numerous legislative findings regarding gender-motivated
violence's effect on commerce. For example, the reports concluded that gender-

motivated violence deterred potential victims from traveling out of state, from
engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting business in
interstate commerce." The majority's refusal to accept the legitimacy and/or
sufficiency of this data indicates that the Court employed a truly higher level of
scrutiny." As the dissent articulated, the GMVA would have passed if it would

have come before the Court between Wickard in 1942 and Lopez in 1995.' During
this time, the Court declined to limit the commerce power through a formalistic
distinction between legislation specifically addressing "commerce" and statutes
addressing "moral" wrongs.'7 In Morrison, the Court distinguished the GMVA
from precedent by labeling it noneconomic; however, pre-Lopez case law simply
does not draw this type of distinction. As stated by the dissent, the Court used an
analysis "of a rather different sort, dependent upon a uniquely judicial competence"

and scrutinizing more than the "rationality of the congressional conclusion.""
Lopez and Morrison reached incorrect conclusions and started down the wrong
path using this stricter form of rational basis in analyzing whether a statute has a
substantial effect on commerce. Based on precedent and historical Supreme Court
blunders in failing to grant Congress plenary power in this area,' the Supreme
Court must limit its review to rationality and leave resolutions such as this to
"Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process."0

Not only does the Morrison court reach an incorrect conclusion, but it sets an
unworkable, unclear standard that will lead to ad hoc determinations of one of the
most important federal judicial issues." Further, Morrison discounts one of the
on precedent despite its lack of legislative findings. Prior to Lopez, the Court did not require legislative
findings and did not consider them a crucial consideration. See Heart of Atlanta, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964) (upholding a law backed by only anecdotal evidence of effect on commerce).
84. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. Lopez implied, misleadingly, that sufficient legislative findings may save future statutes. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (explaining that "congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though
no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye").
The Morrison dissent conceded that most of the data compiled by Congress related to the effects of
violence against women generally, while the civil rights remedy limited its scope to gender-motivated
dissenting). Thus, the GMVA arguably proscribed
crimes. See Morrison,529 U.S. at 629 n.2 (Souter, J.,
a narrower subset of acts than those specifically addressed by the findings. However, the dissent argued
that much of the data referred to criminal conduct with just such gender motivation. Id."In any event,"
the dissent stated, "adopting a cramped reading of the statutory test, and thereby increasing the
constitutional difficulties, would directly contradict one of the most basic canons of statutory
interpretation." I
dissenting).
86. Id. at 637 (Souter, J.,
87. See id.

dissenting). The dissent went on to say, "This new characterization of
88. Id. at 638 (Souter, J.,
substantial effects has no support in our cases (the self-fulfilling prophecies of Lopez aside), least of all
those the majority cites." Id.
dissenting).
89. See id. at 629 n.2 (Souter, J.,
90. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
91. "Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may
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four "considerations" in Lopez that could potentially save a statute with a
questionable effect on interstate commerce: congressional findings. If that
"consideration" did not apply to the GMVA, it will likely not apply to many other
statutes.' Morrison seems to prove that the Court will no longer show deference
to congressional conclusions, even conclusion supported by data tying the activity
to interstate commerce, but will instead look at the activity from its own judicial
standpoint and determine whether the conduct being regulated is sufficiently
"economic" in nature.
To decide whether the Court used something stricter than a rational basis
standard, one can ask the question posed by the dissent: given the congressional
findings and the stated purpose of the law, did Congress make a completely
irrationaldecision in deciding that gender-motivated violence affected commerce?
The Court's refusal to overrule precedent reveals the Court's wariness to abandon
rational basis review. But by refusing to articulate a stricter test, the Court created
a judicially pliable standard, one that gives the courts flexibility, but leaves
Congress - the lawmaking body - in a straightjacket. Put simply, the Court
created bad law.
B. The Majority Misapplied Heart of Atlanta and Created a DetrimentalDistinction Between the Civil Rights Act and the GMVA
In order to state a cause of action under the GMVA, a victim had to prove not
only that the accused committed an act of violence, but also that the violence was
specifically motivated by the victim's gender. The "purpose" clause of the GMVA
stated that the objective of the statute was to "protect the civil rights of victims of
gender-motivated violence."" This noneconomic objective should be compared to
the noneconomic objective of ending racial discrimination in Heart of Atlanta and

in some cases result in legal uncertainty." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
examples of the lingering uncertainty after Morrison, see the statutes discussed infra Part V.
92. The dissent stated:
Passage of the Act was preceded by four years of hearings, which included testimony
from (physicians, law professors, rape survivors, and others]. The record includes reports
on gender bias from task forces in 21 states, and we have the benefit of specific factual
findings in the eight separate Reports issued by Congress... over the long course leading

For

to enactment.
dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
Morrison, 529 U.S. 629-31 (Souter, J.,
93. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994). The section defines "crime of violence motivated by gender"
as "a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part,
to an animus based on the victim's gender." Id. For a general discussion of what was required to prove
a cause of action under the GMVA, see Atkins et a]., supra note 3.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). A statement by one member of Congress proves that Congress
passed the act not to regulate criminal law, but to protect civil rights as it had done in other arenas:
The [GMVA] aims to put gender-motivated bias crimes on the same footing as other bias
crimes. Whether the attack is motivated by racial bias, ethnic bias, or gender bias, the
results are often the same. The victims of this violence are reduced to symbols of group
hatred; they are chosen not because of who they are as individuals but because of their
class status.
Douglas, supra note 9, at 708 (quoting a Senate report).
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McClung. In both cases, Congress had authority to apply the law to privately owned
entities based on the aggregate effect the discrimination had on interstate commerce.
The Court attempted to distinguish Heart of Atlanta and McClung from Lopez
and Morrison because the statute at issue in the earlier cases regulated hotels and
restaurants, both thought of as "economic" establishments. However, this distinction
is arbitrary and detrimental to future civil rights legislation, especially in light of the
Civil Rights Act's underlying focus. The Civil Rights Act aims to curb racial
discrimination (a private, noneconomic activity). The Court upheld the Civil Rights
Act based on the effect racial discrimination had on interstate commerce when
considered in the aggregate. Similarly, the GMVA targeted gender-motivated
violence (a private, noneconomic activity)."5 Congress based its law on the
substantial effect that gender-motivated violence, as an activity, had on interstate
travel, commerce, and the workplace. The crucial question should not be whether
the type of entity affected by the regulation (a hotel or an individual person) has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, but whether the activity being regulated
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. When Congress finds that an
activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, it should be irrelevant who
will potentially feel the blow of the regulation (an economic or noneconomic entity).
Put differently, a finding that gender-motivated violence is not "commerce" does not
dispose of the question of whether gender-motivated violence has a substantial
effect on commerce.'
This unwillingness to follow Heart ofAtlanta, despite the GMVA's clearly stated
purpose of regulating to protect the civil rights of women, could mean two things.
First, it could reaffirm that the Court only purported to follow precedent, but
actually followed a stricter standard than the one set out in Lopez. Second, it could
mean that the Court did not truly accept the GMVA as "civil rights" legislation, but
instead viewed the statute as purely criminal legislation. The majority did, in fact,
state its holding as, "We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce.""8 This holding, however, misstated the activity
Congress sought to regulate. The fact that the civil rights provision provided a
remedy to vindicate criminal conduct should not automatically lead to a conclusion
that the provision regulated state criminal law." The statute did not criminalize all
acts of violence toward women, but limited its scope to providing a federal civil

95. The GMVA did not extend to all random acts of violence, but required the act to be motivated
by gender. See id.
96. Pointing out this flaw in the majority's opinion, Justice Breyer posed the question: "[C]an
Congress simply rewrite the present law and limit its application to restaurants, hotels, perhaps
universities, and other places of public accommodation?" Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). For a similar argument, see Douglas, supra note 9, at 747.
97. For a short summary of this argument, see Peter M. Shane, In Wlhose Best Interest? Not the
States', WASH. POST, May 21, 2000, at B5.

98. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (emphasis added).
99. For a similar argument made in response to the Brzonkala //decision, see Maloney, supra note
36, at 1928.
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remedy for violent conduct toward women specifically motivated by gender."w
This limitation indicated Congress's intent to regulate federal civil rights, rather than
infringe on state criminal law. Notably, the "motivated by gender" requirement in
the statute proved a difficult hurdle for victims to overcome in court."' Although
it may seem that all violence toward women is motivated by some type of gender
animus, courts typically required very specific evidence of this gender animus, such
as verbal expressions of hatred while committing the crime."z In other words,
plaintiffs could not prove this element simply by showing that violence occurred and
occurred against a woman."
Because the majority in Morrison placed large emphasis on the distinction
between "truly national" and "truly local" realms, viewing the GMVA as civil rights
legislation may have saved the statute. Civil rights legislation, unlike criminal law,
has been an area traditionally left to federal regulation." Like the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the GMVA reflected a conscious, deliberate, and well-reasoned
congressional conclusion that gender-motivated violence placed women's civil rights
in jeopardy. In addition, the GMVA sought to protect the "national interest," that
is, to make a statement that the federal government would not tolerate this type of
violence against women. The Court's refusal in Morrison to rely on Heart of
Atlanta as a guide to civil rights statutes passed under the Commerce Clause,
combined with the Court's refusal to acknowledge the civil rights objective of the
statute, combined with the new economic/noneconomic distinction, may leave civil
rights legislation aimed at curbing discrimination by individual actors tragically out
of reach of Commerce Clause power.
C. The GMVA Did Not Infringe upon States' Rights
The Court in Morrison observed that "[the government's] reasoning, moreover,
will not limit Congress to regulating violence, but may.. be applied equally...

100. To state a cause of action for a civil remedy under the GMVA, the victim did not have to
prove a prior criminal conviction. If found liable, the accused faced no criminal penalty that superseded

or took the place of state criminal law. See Atkins et al., supra note 3, at 74.
101. Practitioners applying the VAWA observed the following:
The second prong of a successful VAWA claim requires proof that the crime was not
merely a random act of violence, but rather was committed because of the victim's gender.

While some crimes on the surface appear to demonstrate gender-based animus (e.g. rape
and other sexual assaults), federal courts have disagreed on whether such crimes require
an additional showing of gender-motivated animus ....
[lit is difficult to show that the defendant acted mysoginistically without a smoking
gun, such as violence accompanied by sexist epithets or rape.

Id. at 75 (footnote omitted).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 72 (explaining that although it took a step inthe right direction, the VAWA was not
wholly effective in combating domestic violence because violence committed against an intimate partner

is seldom a meaningless, random event accompanied by obvious gender animus).
104. See Maloney, supra note 36, at 1927-28. "Section 13981 does not regulate 'local criminal
activity,' but rather the discriminatory animus that motivates certain local criminal activity." Id. at 1928
(footnote omitted).
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[to] marriage, divorce, and childbearing. 'as This statement reflects the Court's
concern that if the federal government begins to regulate rape and domestic violence
laws, the government will be able to regulate an unlimited amount of other areas
traditionally left to the states. This concern is unfounded for three reasons. First,
as explained in the previous paragraph, the Court narrowly construed the statute as
solely attempting to regulate violent criminal conduct, ignoring the statute's attempt
to end the underlying discrimination that caused this violent criminal conduct.
When viewed in this manner, the GMVA does not infringe on an area traditionally
left to states, but instead regulates an area that has historically been the province of
the federal government."°
Second, this fear that allowing Congress regulatory leeway will lead to abuse of
its power seems unfounded. Previous congressional action under the Commerce
Clause does not offer any convincing evidence of abuse. Congress used its
"unlimited" and broad-reaching commerce power, for example, to bring our country
out of the depression and to force establishments to end racial discrimination. Now,
Congress attempted to work with states to provide an alternative (not a substitute)
remedy in federal courts for victims of gender-motivated violence, which Congress
recognized as one of the most serious forms of discrimination plaguing our country
today.
Third, the majority found "no significance whatever in the state support for the
Act based upon the States' acknowledged failure to deal adequately with genderbased violence in state courts, and the belief of their own law enforcement agencies
that national action is essential."' 7 This failure brought about the paradoxical
situation of a Supreme Court refusing to infringe upon states' rights when thirtyeight states submitted friend-of-the-court briefs" explaining their own admitted
failure to combat the problem." In their brief, the attorneys general wrote, "The
States' own studies demonstrate that [their] efforts to combat gender-motivated
violence, while substantial, are not sufficient by themselves to remedy the harm
caused by such violence or to eliminate its occurrence.""0 It seems axiomatic,
legalese and constitutional considerations aside, that if a majority of states want a
civil rights problem solved, the federal government should, at the very least, have
means to accomplish this end."' The Morrison decision leaves state courts trying

105. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 579, 615-16 (2000).
106. For example, Congress enacted the Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as federal responses to the problem of racial discrimination. See Deborah J. Merritt, Commerce!,
94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 702 (1995) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressed a history of racial
discrimination that had become endemic and that many states refused to end.").
107. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. See Shane, supra note 97, at B5 (noting that the Court listed protecting states' rights as a
justification for the decision when the states, in fact, requested national help).
110. Id. (alteration in original).
111. In Morrison, states and the federal government seemed to be working together toward a
national solution, which would logically imply Supreme Court deference to the regulation. See Morrison,
529 U.S. at 662 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Mhe law before us seems to represent an instance, not of
state/federal conflict, but of state/federal efforts to cooperate in order to help solve a mutually ack-
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to solve a problem they admittedly cannot handle, and Congress trying in vain to
find a way to pass a statute that will assist them."' When Congress and the states
proceed together, in accord, passing bipartisan legislation to help solve a national
problem of civil rights discrimination, this should impose a strong presumption for
judicial deference. When the Court strikes down state-supported legislation under
the guise of state protection, the Court engages in judicial activism of the strongest
kind."' As noted by the dissent, "Antonio Morrison... 'has won the states' rights
plea against the states themselves.""'
This reluctance to infringe on traditional state areas demonstrates what may be
the underlying ideological debate in Morrison - one between proponents of a
powerful federal government and proponents of states' rights."' The Court's
opinion in Morrisonmay boil down to this debate, despite both sides' rhetoric about
following precedent. In reality, "precedent" represented a certain political ideology
(deference to Congress) that five conservative Justices believed went too long

unchecked by the judicial branch. Whether or not the Court agrees with the wisdom
of infringing on traditional state areas,"' the check on these kinds of laws lies in
the political election of Congress."' If Congress elects to solve a national problem
that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, it cannot be relevant that the
"area" has traditionally been one of state concern."'

nowledged national problem.").
112. President Clinton issued a statement expressing his deep "disappointment" following the
Morrison decision. He said, "Because I continue to believe that there should be remedies for victims of
gender-motivated violence, we plan to study the Supreme Court's decision ... to determine the best
means to help these victims." Laurie Asseo, Rape Victims Denied Federal Litigation, TULSA WORLD,
May 16, 2000, at 5.
113. In Morrison, both sides accused the other of a form of judicial activism. The dissent accused
the majority of activism in failing to follow precedent, while the majority accused the dissent of judicial
activism by not following a strict interpretation of language and intent behind the Commerce Clause.
114. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
115. See Kathy Rodgers, Are We Really Ready for State's Rights?, SAN DIEGO UNION TIB., May
25, 2000, at B I1 (arguing that the Morrison Court's "New Federalism" is a euphemism for state's rights,
which have long been a symbol and reality of second-class citizenship for women and minorities).
116. Interestingly, Justice Souter, in a footnote in his dissenting opinion, explained that he repeatedly
appears before Congress to argue against the federalization of traditional state crimes and questions the
wisdom of exercising commerce power to its limit. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 636 n.10 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). However, Justice Souter acknowledged that "violence may be found to affect interstate
commerce and affect it substantially," and that congressional wisdom, not his own, must dictate. Id.
(emphasis added).
117. Politics should not completely define the commerce power; however, the Morrison majority
did not "merely engag[e] in the judicial task of patrolling the outer boundaries of that congressional
authority," but in fact circumscribed Commerce Clause power by framing it in terms of categorical
exceptions. Id. at 652 n.19 (Souter, J., dissenting).
118. See Rodgers, supra note 115, at BI I ("[Morrison's lawyers] said violence is a local, state
matter, not a federal concern. That sounds like a lot of the arguments we heard until very recently that
states and local police couldn't address domestic violence because it is a family matter, not a crime. And
like all the pemicious arguments during the civil rights movement supporting racial segregation because
that was part of the local, historical tradition."); Shane, supranote 97, at B5 ("As for the second point that Congress had overstepped its authority and was setting a precedent for regulating almost any activity
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D. Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment, Though Not the Subject of Morrison,
May Become Important to Future Civil Rights Legislation
In addition to the Commerce Clause, Congress also relied on Section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the GMVA. Section 5 grants Congress the
power to apply the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause to state actors"9 and
to use its discretion in deciding what legislation is necessary to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Because the GMVA remedied private
action, rather than state action, the GMVA faced considerable problems trying to
pass as Section 5 equal protection legislation. The Morrison majority rejected the
government's argument that because state justice systems perpetuate an "array of
erroneous stereotypes" that result in denying victims of gender-motivated violence
the equal protection of the laws, Congress had the power to deter future instances
of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.'2' Citing United States v.
Harris'" and In re Civil Rights Cases" as authority, the Court held that "[the

GMVA] is not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth
Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is directed not at any state or state actor,
but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.''

The Court required that the GMVA specifically direct its provision toward the state
criminal justice systems, rather than toward the private individual, in order for the

Fourteenth Amendment to provide support for the legislation.2
The government argued that the recent Supreme Court decisions of United States
v. Guest'" and District of Columbia v. Carter'" stood for the new idea that

the proper constitutional response is - 'So what.' The Constitution gives each branch of government
a variety of exclusive and far-ranging powers that are plainly susceptible of abuse. The president, with
his pardon power, could empty the federal prisons - but no president has done that .... For the elected
branches, the primary check on abuse of discretion is not judicial review, but political accountability:
We can vote them out of office.")
119. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 ("Section 5 states that Congress may enforce, by appropriate
legislation the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of... equal protection of
the laws.").
120. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
121. Morrison,529 U.S. at 620. For examples of such stereotypes, see Lynn Hecht Schafran, Judges
Cite Gender Bias Task Force Reports, JuDF.s' J.,
Spring 2000, at 13 ("[T]he trial judge's perceptions
[were] indicated by statements relating to marriage such as 'And why, in heaven's name do you buy the
cow when you get the milk free ... ' (quoting In re Marriage of Iverson, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70, 72
(1992)).
122. 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882) (holding section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 unconstitutional
on grounds that the law was "directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference
to the laws of the State, or their administration by her officers").
123. 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (holding public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1875 unconstitutional because the provisions applied to purely private conduct).
124. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
125. For an expansion on this point, see Carroll, supra note 60, at 833.
126. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). In Guest, three members of the Court expressed the view that the Civil
Rights Caseswere wrongly decided and that Congress could prohibit actions by private individuals under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at777 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
127. 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (containing a footnote citing the three-Justice opinion in Guest).
-
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Congress could prohibit actions by private individuals, as well as state actors, under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected the idea that Guest
mandated a new interpretation of Section 5, reasoning, "Though these three Justices
saw fit to opine on matters not before the Court in Guest, the Court had no occasion
to revisit the Civil Rights Cases and Harris,having determined [the indictment] in
fact contain[ed] an express allegation of state involvement."" Further, the Court
dismissed Carter as entirely unpersuasive dicta. In sum, the Court found that
because the GMVA was not corrective in its character, or adapted to redress the
operation of prohibited state action, it could not pass as equal protection legislation
applied to the states.' " The dissent did not reach the Fourteenth Amendment issue
and chose not to comment on the significance of Guest in relation to future civil
rights legislation. However, Justice Breyer, writing only for himself, indicated his
belief that Congress should be able to enact a civil remedy against private
actors.'
Because Morrison did not focus on the government's Fourteenth Amendment
argument, the opinion does not completely close off this type of argument in future
cases. With the Court continually shrinking the size of Congress's commerce
power, 3' Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may become increasingly
important to the success of civil rights legislation aimed at ending discrimination
against women and minorities. Particularly significant to this Fourteenth
Amendment discussion is Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta,
the primary case upholding civil rights legislation passed under the Commerce
Clause. In this concurrence, Justice Douglas expressed his reluctance to rest the
basis for civil rights legislation solely on Commerce Clause power "not due to any
conviction that Congress lacks power to regulate commerce in the interest of human
rights," ' but because of his belief that the right of people to be free from
discrimination "occupies a more protected position in our constitutional3 3system than
does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel, and coal across state lines.'
Justice Douglas would have passed Title H of the Civil Rights Act under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to avoid unnecessary litigation over

128. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 623 (quoting Guest, 383 U.S. at 756). The Court also stated, "[lIt would
take more than the naked dicta contained in Justice Clark's opinion, when added to Justice Brennanes

opinion, to cast doubt upon the enduring vitality of the Civil Rights Cases and Harris." Id. at 624.
129. See id, (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 2, 18 (1883)).
130. Id. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In this short analysis expressing his doubts about the
majority's conclusion, Justice Breyer wrote that the GMVA "restricts private actors only by imposing
liability for private conduct that is... already forbidden by state law. Why is the remedy 'disproportionate?'

Id.

131. As stated by Columbia University professor Michael Dorf, "'None of these decisions is
necessarily a bar to congressional action, but in combination, all the doors begin to close,'... 'Because
of state sovereign immunity, and because of the narrowing of the commerce clause and the 14th
Amendment, there is a fair amount that Congress cannot regulate."' David G. Savage, Endangered
Statutes: U.S. Law Protecting Crime Victims, Environment Could Fall, 86 A.B.A. J., July 2000, at 32,
33 (quoting Michael Dorf).
132. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964).
133. Id. (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941)).
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whether each particular hotel or restaurant fell within the commerce definition of
the Act."3 Justice Douglas argued that privately owned restaurants and hotels fell
under the "state action" requirement of Section 5 of the Equal Protection Clause
because the discrimination at issue was enforced by officials of the state through the
state judiciary."' Justice Douglas's view would support the argument that gendermotivated violence was an appropriate exercise of congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the state judiciaries enforced the
discrimination Congress sought to regulate, particularly given the evidence of
gender bias within the court system regarding violence against
significant
1
women. 3
This concurrence, combined with dicta in Guest and Harris, may provide the
basis for a future argument that civil rights legislation, even legislation aimed at
private individuals, falls more squarely under Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
power than Congress's Commerce Clause power. Justice Douglas correctly feared
that future civil rights statutes would receive the same constitutional analysis as
fruit, steel, and coal; he also correctly prophesied that civil rights legislation needed
a stronger constitutional foothold than the Commerce Clause power. 37 Realistically, however, without additional support, an expansion on the three-Justice opinion
in Guest, or a change in the members of the Court, the Court will not likely accept
an argument of this kind. Before and after Morrison, it remains well-settled law that
a Section 5 violation requires explicit state action."

134. Id. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg also authored a similar concurring
opinion, expressing his belief that the statute should have been passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Goldberg wrote, "The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act... is the vindication
concurring).
of human dignity and not mere economics." Id. at 291 (Goldberg, J.,
135. Id. at 282 (Douglas, J., concurring).
136. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,631 n.7 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (compiling
findings of various task forces on gender bias in the court system).
137. Yale law professor Akhil Amar contends that the Supreme Court could have used its power
over civil rights to uphold the GMVA:
For all the debate over Congress' power over commerce. . . Amar faults the justices for
ignoring the more obvious source for federal power over civil rights. "The real problem
is their stingy understanding of the Civil War amendments," says Amar .... These
amendments were all about empowering Congress to enforce civil rights ....And it's sad
to say, none of the justices are willing to join that debate today."
Savage, supra note 131, at 33 (quoting Amar).
138. See Lavia v. Pa. Dep'tof Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000). In Lavia, the court held
that "Congress did not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to a valid exercise
of its § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] enforcement powers." Id. at 202. In so holding, the court cited
Morrison for affirmation that the "Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action, and does not
protect against wrongful conduct by private persons or entities." Id. at 201; see also United States v.
Blaine County, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Mont. 2001) (citing Morrison for the idea that the Section 5
enforcement power deals only with enforcement against states and not against individuals, but
distinguishing the Voting Rights Act at issue because it was directed at state actors only).
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V. PracticalImpact: How Have District and Circuit Courts Ruled on Various
Types of Statutes Since Morrison?
For better or worse, courts must attempt to follow the Morrison standard when
deciding current Commerce Clause issues. This section provides examples of
different types of statutes that have been recently challenged using the Morrison
decision and a brief description of the courts' treatment of each challenge. This
section provides a practical tool for assessing the constitutionality of certain statutes
and their application after Morrison. At the same time, this section demonstrates
that Morrison places necessary regulation in jeopardy.
A. Convictions Under Racketeering Statutes Upheld Based on Each Statute's
JurisdictionalNexus
Convictions under certain federal criminal statutes, such as the Hobbs Act' and
the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (the VCAR), have been the
4
subject of frequent challenges since the Supreme Court handed down Morrison.''
These statutes face challenges because they criminalize violent conduct that (in
some instances) has an arguably negligible effect on interstate commerce. For
4
example, the defendant in a Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Malone, ' used
Morrison to argue that his conviction under the Hobbs Act was unconstitutional
because the Hobbs standard required that his conduct have only a "de minimus"
effect on interstate commerce. 4 The defendant in Malone argued that, after
Morrison, a mere de minimus effect was not sufficient to support a federal
conviction.'" However, the court upheld the de minimus standard, reasoning,
"Unlike the statutes at issue in Morrison and Lopez, the Hobbs Act regulates
economic activity. Furthermore, the Hobbs Act contains an explicit and expansive
jurisdictional element establishing that it is in pursuance of Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce." 45

139. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994). The statute, known as the Hobbs Act, falls under chapter ninety-five
on racketeering and is entitled, Interferencewith Commerce by Threats or Violence. The relevant portion
of the statute reads, "Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion... or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property . . . in violation of this section shall be fined ... or
imprisoned ..... Id.
§ 1959. The statute also falls under the racketeering chapter and makes it a separate federal
140. Id.
crime to murder, kidnap, assault, or commit other serious bodily harm to another while engaged in
racketeering activities. See id.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir. 2000).
142. 222 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2000).
143. Id. at 1294.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1295; see also United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1087 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
a defendant's argument that, when applied to non-racketeering robberies, the Hobbs Act requires more
than a minimal impact on interstate commerce and holding that the jurisdictional element ensures the
nexus between the conduct at issue and interstate commerce).
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In United States v. Feliciano," a criminal defendant argued that his conviction
under the VCAR was unconstitutional because the VCAR regulated noneconomic,
violent conduct based solely on that conducts aggregate effect on interstate
commerce. 47 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, distinguishing the statute
at issue in Morrison and the VCAR because the VCAR included a jurisdictional

element and covered only those violent crimes linked to the perpetrator's position
in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.'" Further, the court reasoned that

the racketeering activity satisfying the jurisdictional element

-

narcotics traffick-

ing - was clearly economic in nature. 49 While the violent conduct itself may not
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the racketeering activity the
violence is committed in connection with does have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Because statutes with an express jurisdictional nexus (such as the Hobbs
Act and the VCAR) link the violent conduct to an underlying economic activity that
affects interstate commerce, the convictions will likely be upheld."s
B. Various Possession Statutes Survive Facial Challenges Because of Their
JurisdictionalNexus
Defendants also frequently challenge statutes "federalizing" the possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon' or the possession of a firearm by a person subject

A conviction under the Hobbs Act poses a particular constitutional problem when it is based on the
robbery of an individual rather than a business. Addressing this problem, the Ninth Circuit stated, "IT]he
taking of small sums of money from an individual has its primary and direct impact on that individual
and not on the national economy." United States v. Lynch, 265 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2001)
(challenging conviction using Morrison). At least four circuits (Eighth, Eleventh, Fifth, and Ninth) have
explicitly adopted a test for determining whether this type of robbery would have the requisite "de
minimus" effect on interstate commerce to withstand a constitutional challenge. Id. at 762-63. Under this
test, a crime directed at an individual violates the Hobbs Act only if
(1) the acts deplete the assets of an individual who is directly and customarily engaged
in interstate commerce; (2) if the acts cause or create the likelihood that the individual
will deplete the assets of an entity engaged in interstate commerce; or (3) if the number
of individuals victimized or the sum at stake is so large that there will be some cumulative
effect on interstate commerce.
Id. at 762. With the rise in the number of challenges to Hobbs Act convictions, the crime's actual tie to
interstate commerce will become increasingly crucial.
146. 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000).
147. Id.
at 119.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See also United States v. Kee, No. SI 98 CR 778(DLC), 2000 WL 863117 (S.D.N.Y. June 27,
2000) (holding the VCAR constitutional and reasoning that "it is the effect on interstate commerce of
the enterprise, not the violent crime itself, which must be evaluated" and that "a purely intrastate crime
will satisfy the jurisdictional element ... if it is committed in connection with an enterprise whose
activities affect interstate commerce").
151. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). For Tenth Circuit cases addressing a facial challenge to this
statute based on a LopeziMorrisonargument, see United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582 (10th Cir. 2000)
and United States v. Price, No. 99-7078, 2001 WL 1040776 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 2001). Price also
addresses a Morrison-basedchallenge to a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), prohibiting the distribution
of cocaine. Price, 2001 WL 1040776, at *8. The Tenth Circuit held, "Because Morrison involved the
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to a domestic violence restraining order.' These possession statutes face difficulty
because, like the GMVA and the GFSZA, they potentially regulate intrastate,
noneconomic activity. However, courts continually distinguish these possession
statutes from Lopez and Morrison based on their jurisdiction-conferring element.'
For example, the Ninth Circuit addressed this type of challenge and held that the
jurisdictional element brought the statute within congressional Commerce Clause
power." The reasoning behind these decisions is that a jurisdictional element
ensures (at least theoretically), on a case-by-case basis, that the specific violation
in question affected interstate commerce. The GMVA, in contrast, created a civil
remedy for all acts of gender-motivated violence, with no requirement that the
specific act of violence at issue somehow affected interstate commerce.s
C. Applications of the FederalArbitrationAct (FAA) Challenged on Grounds
That the Contract Does Not Have a SubstantialLink to Interstate Commerce
Two Alabama cases demonstrate confusion regarding how to apply a Commerce
Clause analysis to specific contracts containing an arbitration clause governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act. In Ex parte Stewart,'56 independent newspaper dealers
petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing a lower court to vacate an order
compelling arbitration of their claims against a newspaper publisher. The court
denied the writ of mandamus on grounds that the contract involved interstate
commerce because the newspapers were part of the flow of interstate commerce.'
Therefore, the contract invoked the FAA and the arbitration clause was enforceable.
Interestingly, this case had a vigorous three-judge dissent, arguing that the court's
opinion (1) ignored the new jurisprudence outlined in the Lopez and Morrison

regulation of non-economic activities, while § 841(a)(1) deals with the regulation of economic activities,
Morrisondoes not require a different conclusion than the one (previously reached]." Id.
For a case analyzing the facial constitutionality of five different federal criminal statutes, including
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after the Morrisondecision, see United States v. Furrow, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1178
(11th Cir. 2000).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000); see also, e.g., United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394 (6th Cir.
2000).
153. After Lopez, Congress added a jurisdictional element to the GFSZA and it now passes judicial
scrutiny. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
154. United States v. Bowens, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see also United States
v. Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761, 762 (ND. Ohio 2000) (acknowledging that Morrison requires
courts to focus "more on the actuality of the relationship between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce, and less on the legislatively-stated link between the two," and yet holding § 922(g)(8)
constitutional because it contained a jurisdictional nexus and was part of a larger statutory scheme);
United States v. Bunnell, 106 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D. Me. 2000) (same); United States v. Singletary, No.
CR.00-199, 2000 WL 962993 at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2000) (holding § 922(g)(1) constitutional because
of its "inclusion of a specific jurisdiction conferring element of the crime - that the firearm possessed
by the previously convicted felon moved in interstate commerce or was possessed by him in affecting
commerce").
155. However, the statute did have a gender-animus requirement that ensured, on a case-by-case
basis, that gender discrimination occurred.
156. 786 So. 2d 464 (Ala. 2000).
157. Id. at 469.
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decisions and (2) allowed application of the FAA despite the contract's insubstantial
effect on interstate commerce.'" The dissent chastised the majority for analyzing

the FAA as either category-one or category-two legislation: "A contract is neither
a channel nor an instrumentality, but suggests instead an activity.... [The] case,
therefore, falls in the third Lopez category... [and] must have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce."'5 9 Viewing the contract between the two companies as
purely local and void of any substantial effect on interstate commerce, as required
by Morrison, the dissent would not have enforced the arbitration clause in this
instance." °
In University of South Alabama Foundation v. Walley,'"' the court addressed
motions to compel arbitration under the FAA. The court phrased the issue as
whether each contract "has the necessary affect [sic] on interstate commerce ... to
fall within the FAA's scope."" Thus, the court conducted a category-three
analysis. In contrast to Ex Parte Stewart, the court summarily concluded that all
contracts involving more than a nominal sum have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce because they involve the exchange of property or services.'6 Interestingly, the court cited Morrison's approval of Wickard's aggregation principle and
reasoned that the cumulative effect of the various health-care contracts make them
the proper subject of arbitration.'"
D. Child Support Recovery Act Struck Down, Despite Its Seemingly Economic
Purpose
In United States v. Faasse,' the Sixth Circuit struck down the Child Support
158. Id. at 469-73 (Lyons, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 470 (Lyons, J., dissenting).
160. The dissent reasoned, "To hold otherwise would assume that .. . Congress could require
arbitration of a contract between a local newspaper and a young person ... who throws papers from his
or her bicycle." Id. at 473 (Lyons, J., dissenting). For another case with a strong dissent discussing the
majority's misapplication of the Lopez/Morrison analysis in regard to an arbitration clause, see Selma
Med. Cir., Inc. v. Fontenot,No. 1991793, 2001 WL 873615 (Ala. Aug. 3, 2001).
161. No. Civ.A 99-D-1287-N, 2001 WL 237309 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 2001).
162. Id. at *3.
163. L
164. Id. at *4.
165. 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000). Since the time of this research, the Sixth Circuit vacated the
Faasse opinion, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2001), and reheard the case en bane, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir.
2001). Upon rehearing, the court reversed and held that the CSRA was, in fact, within the Commerce
Clause power. In reaching this decision, the en bane court classified the money payment (or absence
thereof) as a "thing" in interstate commerce and upheld the CSRA as category-two regulation. Id. at 48586.
Per usual, this case had a vigorous dissent. The dissent argued that the majority (1) misinterpreted
the thrust of Lopez and Morrison, idL at 494 (Batchelder, J., dissenting); and (2) severely blundered in
classifying a "debt owed to one in another state" as a thing in interstate commerce, id. at 499 n.2
(Batchelder, J., dissenting). "Congress's jurisdiction is not premised on the severity of a problem.., or
the fact that a federal solution might be more convenient. The failure... to comply with a child-support
order does not burden commerce among the states in any way." Id. at 503 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
The majority's upholding of the CSRA as category-two regulation demonstrates that, after Morrison,
courts will look for alternative methods to uphold necessary regulations.
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Recovery Act (CSRA),'" which criminalized the nonpayment of child support on
behalf of an out-of-state child, as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority.'6 The court stated the goals of the CSRA as (1)
preventing noncustodial parents from fleeing across state lines to avoid paying child
support and (2) recovering past-due support payments.' 6 Yet the court held the
statute unconstitutional, finding that the actual text of the statute reached "far
beyond these stated goals."'" The court viewed the statute as a disruption of
federalism, reasoning that the Act obliterated discretion invested in Michigan judges
by creating a federal criminal penalty for disobedience of support orders. 70 This
opinion followed Lopez and Morrisonstrictly, and interpreted the aggregate-effects
principle narrowly: "[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that Wickard [only]
applies to laws that are an 'essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated."""' Further, the court concluded that child support orders are not
commercial in nature because they do not put an item into the flow of commerce." Apparently, Congress's conclusion that $1.6 billion in interstate child
support go unpaid annually did not "amount to a congressional
conclusion that
'
unpaid child support substantially affects interstate commerce."' 7
Faassedemonstrates that Lopez and Morrisoncaused substantial shifts in judicial
reasoning on Commerce Clause issues: a presumption toward unconstitutionality
rather than legislative deference, a "stricter" scrutiny approach rather than a rational
basis approach, and a narrow view rather than a broad view of what constitutes
commercial or economic activity. 74
E. Freedom of Access to Clinic EntrancesAct Upheld, but on Shaky Ground
In United States v. Gregg,7 a two-Justice majority upheld the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) 76 as a constitutional exercise of commerce

166. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
167. See Faasse,227 F.3d at 662. In so holding, the court reversed a lower court affirmation of a
magistrate's order to enforce a judgment against the father. Prosecutors charged the father in this case
with one count of willful failure to pay past-due child support, in violation of the CSRA. See id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 663. The court reasoned, "TMhe text of the Child Support Recovery Act contains no
mention of interstate flight, nor does it confine its reach to recovery of delinquent payments ....This
language is overinclusive; it predicates criminal jurisdiction not on flight across state lines, but on simple

diversity of residence." See id. at 663-64.
170. Id. at 665.
171. Id. at 671 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
172. Id. at 669.
173. Id. at 671.
174. The original Faasseopinion, explained in this section, found the argument that debts from one
state to another are commercial in nature unpersuasive, reasoning that support obligations represent
passive, rather than active, obstructions to commerce. I.668-69. As previously explained, this holding
has since been overruled. See supra note 165.
175. 226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000).
176. 8 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
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power.'" FACE bars abortion protestors from blocking the entrances to reproductive-health-care clinics and provides a civil remedy to compensate individuals and
health-care facilities for harm caused by blockades. 1 " In upholding the statute, the
court acknowledged that the statute's connection to economic activity plays a key
role in determining constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, but held that
"economic activity can be understood in broad terms."'
The court distinguished FACE from the GMVA by stating, "[U]nlike the activity
prohibited by [the GMVA], the misconduct regulated by FACE, although not
motivated by commercial concerns, has an effect which is, at its essence,
economic. "" Both statutes provided a civil remedy for violent conduct directed
at a certain group and motivated by animus. Gregg distinguished the two statutes
on grounds that FACE proscribes violent conduct directed at a commercial
enterprise, rather than an individual. However, as argued by the dissent in Gregg,
"Morrisonmade it clear that the nature of the activity to be restricted is determined
by an examination of the conduct itself, and not by such external factors as financial
effects, which are one step removed from the statute's focus."' Thus, Gregg
purports to follow Morrison, but actually relies on a more expansive definition of
economic activity than the Morrison majority would likely allow.
A federal case out of Michigan, Norton v. Reno," also upheld the
constitutionality of FACE. In Norton, plaintiffs desiring to protest outside an
abortion clinic sought injunctive relief from enforcement of FACE on grounds that
the statute exceeded the Commerce Clause power. The court denied the injunction
and distinguished Morrison on grounds that reproductive-health-service centers, the
objects of the regulation, engage in interstate commerce." Therefore, the court
reasoned, Congress sought to regulate a commercial facility rather than "crime
against another individual on the basis of gender" as in Morrison.'u
Congress should be able to pass statutes such as FACE under the commerce
power; however, in light of Morrison,FACE encounters considerable problems due
to the similarity between the GMVA and FACE. Both statutes, at their core, seek
to protect individuals from discriminatory behavior. (It is hard to imagine that, in
passing FACE, Congress had the economic stability of the abortion clinics in mind.)
The fact that the behavior, in the case of FACE, takes place directly outside a

177. Gregg, 226 F.3d at 267.
178. See id. at 257.
179. Id. at 262. As authority, the Gregg court cited numerous circuit cases upholding FACE;
however, every case cited was issued prior to the Morrison decision. See id. at 261.
180. Id. at 262.
181. Id. at 270 (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent also offered an interesting counterargument to Part
IV.D of this note (which argues that Morrison did not follow Heart of Atlanta precedent). The dissent
distinguished Heartof Atlanta from Morrison by pointing out that it was the hotels and restaurants, the
economic entities themselves, that had to alter their conduct under the statute, rather than third parties
whose conduct may or may not have been commercial. Id.
182. No. 4:00-CV-141, 2000 WL 1769580 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2000) (citing Gregg as authority
to uphold the constitutionality of FACE).
183. Id. at *5.
184. Id.
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commercial establishment seems to be an arbitrary distinction. By this rationale, if
the GMVA had prohibited acts of violence against women within so many feet of
a grocery store and been called the Freedom of Access to Grocery Store Parking
Lots, would the GMVA have been constitutional? If the Supreme Court does
ultimately uphold FACE, it will have to do so based on a somewhat arbitrary
distinction. These types of arguments, over whether the activity being regulated is
sufficiently "economic" in nature, will continue to plague the courts until the Court
announces a less malleable test.
F. Environmental Statute Upheld, but Also on Shaky Ground
After the Morrison decision, which affirmed the Fourth Circuit's finding of the
GMVA's unconstitutionality, the Fourth Circuit addressed another Commerce Clause
challenge, this time to an environmental regulation. Surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit
upheld the statute." 5 This case, Gibbs v. Babbit," provides a telling example of
the lingering and unsettled controversy engendered by the Morrisondecision. Gibbs
upheld a Fish and Wildlife Service regulation'" limiting the "taking""' of red
wolves on private land as a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause." The court labeled its standard of review as "rational basis
review with teeth," yet also counseled that "courts may not simply tear through the
considered judgments of Congress."'"
The court upheld the statute as category-three regulation, that which has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, for four reasons. 9' The court (1) viewed
the taking of red wolves on private land as a sufficiently "economic" activity due
to its effect on tourism, scientific research jobs, and trade in fur pelts;" (2)
applied the Wickard aggregation principle and found the effect on interstate
commerce substantial in light of the larger regulatory scheme of the Endangered
Species Act;9 (3) found that wildlife regulation was not an area of traditional
state concern;'" and (4) determined that the regulation did not infringe on state

185. Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000).
186. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). Interestingly, the dissenting judge in this case, Judge l.,uttig,

authored the Fourth Circuit opinion affirmed in Morrison.
187. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (1998). Congress passed this statute pursuant to a specific provision in
the Endangered Species Act, which allows the Fish and Wildlife Service to issue regulations governing
the taking of experimental reintroduced animal populations under limited circumstances. See Gibbs, 214
F.3d at 488.
188. "Taking" for the purposes of this statute means harassing, harming, shooting, wounding, killing,
trapping, capturing, collecting, or attempting to engage in any such conduct. See id. at 487.
189. ld.
190. Id.
at 490.
191. The district court upheld the legislation as category-two legislation, reasoning that the red
wolves were "things" in interstate commerce because they moved across state lines and generated
tourism. Gibbs v. Babbit, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1998).

192. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491 ("[E]conomic activity must be [viewed] in broad terms. Indeed, a
cramped view of commerce would cripple a foremost federal power and so in doing would eviscerate
national authority.").
193. let
at 497-98.
194. Ua at 499-500.
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police power because, unlike the GFSZA and the GMVA, the regulation did not
duplicate or supplement state law.'95 Predictably, the dissenting judge in Gibbs,

who authored the Fourth Circuit en banc opinion affirmed by Morrison,accused the
majority of following the Morrison dissent.'" The dissenting judge also rejected

the majority's use of aggregation and reasoned that the
killing of.

.

. all forty-one of the estimated red wolves that live on

private property in North Carolina would not constitute an economic
activity of the kind held by the Court... in Morrison to be of central
concern to the Commerce Clause, if it could be said to constitute an
economic activity at all."
Although the dissenting judge in Gibbs criticized the majority for not following
Morrison, the dissent should have criticized the authors of Morrison for not
outlining a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis, if that is what courts are
meant to employ. While the Gibbs opinion did more closely mirror Justice Souter's

dissent in Morrison than the majority, it also mirrored sixty years of precedent not
explicitly overruled by Morrison. Gibbs not only demonstrates Morrison's
unworkability, but also demonstrates the very real possibility that environmental
protection will soon play second fiddle to the whims of local government. The
Gibbs determination that this statute regulated "economic" activity rests on a weak
foundation in light of Morrisonand proves that the Supreme Court should not have
invoked this categorical approach to Commerce Clause regulation. Environmental
regulation passed under the commerce power hangs in the balance until the Supreme
Court backs away from Lopez and Morrison.'"

195. Id. at 503.
196. See id at 508 (Luttig, J., dissenting) ("In a word, the expansive view of the Commerce power
expressed by the majority today is [more] akin to that separately expressed by Justice Breyer in his
dissent in Lopez and Justice Souter in his dissent in Morrison, and certainly more closely akin to those
dissenting Justices' views than it is to the [majority].").
197. ld. at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
198. A Supreme Court decision in the environmental context, Solid Waste Agency v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, struck down Congress's attempt to protect habitats of migratory birds through
certain provisions of the Clean Water Act, based on the Lopez/Morrison rationale. Solid Waste Agency
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The same five-Justice majority and the same fourJustice dissent as in Morrison disagreed again over issues of federalism. The Court held that a rule
extending the definition of navigable waters under the Clean Water Act to include intrastate waters used
as habitats by migratory birds exceeded authority granted to the Engineer Corps under the Clean Water
Act. Id. at 167. Thus, the Court allowed a local subdivision contractor to discharge dredged material into
a sand and gravel pit that served as a habitat for migratory birds. The dissent argued,
Had petitioner intended to engage in some other activity besides discharging fill (i.e. had
there been no activity to regulate), or, conversely, had the waters not been habitat for
migratory birds (i.e. had there been no basis for federal jurisdiction), the Corps would
never have become involved in petitioner's use of its land. There can he no doubt that,
unlike the class of activities Congress was attempting to regulate in [Morrison] and
[Lopez], the discharge of fill material into the Nation's waters is almost always undertaken
for economic reasons.
Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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G. FairHousing Act Amendments (FHAA) Survive Challenge by Local Housing
Provider
In Groome Resources, Ltd. v. Parish,'" a parish refused to approve a special
zoning accommodation to allow the operation of a group home for Alzheimer's
patients. After the housing provider sought injunctive relief under the "reasonable
accommodation" provision of the FHAA, a the parish challenged the accommodations provision as an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause power.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conducted a category-three analysis,
applied the four factors outlined in Morrison, and found that the FHAA substantially
affected interstate commerce." Finding that the Act regulates the economic
activity of purchasing and renting a home, the court reasoned that the denial of
housing to a disabled person is an "act of discrimination that directly interferes with
a commercial transaction, and is an act that can be regulated to facilitate economic
activity."' Thus, the court viewed discrimination as the activity being regulated,
and then viewed its impact on commerce as substantial because that discrimination
resulted in an individual's inability to participate in an economic transaction.
Notably, this reasoning is similar to that argued for and rejected in Morrison. The
Fifth Circuit emphasized the "strong tradition of civil rights enforced through the
Commerce Clause" and the "broadly defined 'economic' aspect of
discrimination."' Additionally, the court acknowledged the traditionally local
nature and local power of zoning boards, but recognized the need for federal courts
to step in and enforce antidiscrimination when that discrimination is the direct result
of local bias. Groome Resources demonstrates that federal institutions such as
the FHAA may face increasing constitutional challenges because they arguably
direct legislation at "purely local" decisions such as zoning.
H. What Can PractitionersGleanfrom These Decisions?
From these post-Morrison decisions, practitioners can draw four conclusions.
First, as long as a statute contains a jurisdictional nexus such as "that moved in
interstate commerce" or "that was transported in interstate commerce," it will likely
be upheld. Second, statutes closely related to family law, divorce law, or criminal
law that do not contain a jurisdictional element may face insurmountable
constitutional arguments because they are noneconomic and infringe on a traditional
area of state concern. Courts can, after Morrison, draw conclusions based solely on

Further, the dissent reasoned, "[T]he migratory bird rule does not blur the 'distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local' [citing Morrison]. Justice Holmes cogently observed in Missouri
v. Hollandthat the protection of migratory birds is a textbook example of a national problem." Id. at 195
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). This case demonstrates the profound effect of the new
Commerce Clause approach on environmental protection measures.
199. 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2000).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (Supp. 1 2001).
201. Groome, 234 F.3d at 205.
202. Id. at 205-06.
203. Id. at 209.
204. Id. at 216.
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the category of conduct being regulated (e.g., family law = noneconomic = unconstitutional), and are not forced to consider the more removed effects of the
conduct on interstate commerce. Third, the Lopez/Morrison standard will not
produce logical or consistent opinions. As the cases in Part V demonstrate, the
Commerce Clause determination will inevitably vary based on whether the judge
applies a more lenient, Wickard-type rational basis test or a stricter version of the
rational basis test. Courts have excessive judicial leeway to decide whether certain
activities are or are not sufficiently "economic" in nature. Thus, practitioners should
address each of the four Morrison considerations, focusing on proving or refuting
the "economic" nature of the activity being regulated. Unfortunately, future
decisions will likely split down ideological lines, will have vigorous dissents, and
will reveal the controversy generated, rather than solved, by the Morrisondecision.
Finally, civil rights legislation aimed at preventing individual discrimination in a
local or noneconomic context is in serious jeopardy unless the Court gives Congress
another avenue to pass civil rights legislation. 5
VI. Conclusion: The Court Should Head Back in the Pre-Lopez Direction
The Framers of the United States Constitution, in granting Congress the power
to regulate interstate commerce, did not contemplate Congress using the commerce
power to combat gender-motivated violence. The Framers also did not contemplate
Congress using the commerce power to end racial segregation in local restaurants,
to lead the country out of the depression, or to ensure housing for the disabled.
Certainly, the Framers did not contemplate our complex, increasingly connected
interstate economy resulting from technological innovations such as aviation and the
Internet. However, an absence of contemplation must not equal an absence of
constitutional authority to regulate. In fact, federalism must rely on flexibility, a
mutual interdependence between state and federal governments that expands and
contracts as the country's needs change.
The GMVA provided a perfect example of this need for such flexibility: violence
against women, as an activity, is noneconomic in nature and has traditionally been
an area of state regulation. However, in light of developments in our understanding
of the discriminatory motivation behind violence against women, coupled with
states' inability to combat the problem, Congress recognized that this particular type
of activity evolved into an area of federal, as well as local, concern. The GMVA
accomplished important, desirable aims and provided a civil remedy to victims of
gender-motivated violence in the Tenth Circuit and federal courts across the nation.
After Morrison,courts have free range to second guess congressional conclusions
based on years of research and compilations of data. This new Commerce Clause

205. Another example of questionable legislation includes the regulation of hate crimes, which make
it a federal crime to attack another based on race, religion, or national origin. See Savage, supranote
131, at 33. The House recently backed a measure that would add sexual orientation, sex, and disabilities
to this list. See Lizette Alvarez, House Backs Adding Gays to Hate Crime Law, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 14,
2000, at A20. However, according to law professor Erwin Chemerinsky, "'A hate crimes law for gays
would be very difficult to justify under the Brzonkala decision."' See Savage, supra note 131, at 33.
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analysis leaves civil rights, environmental, and other types of legislation in jeopardy
and ultimately leads the country down a destructive path. Instead of the heightened
judicial scrutiny endorsed by Morrison,the check on commerce power must be the
democratic process.'
Jodi FowlerJayne

206. As eloquently stated by Justice Breyer,
Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a
significant factual connection to interstate commerce - both because the Constitution
delegates the commerce power directly to Congress and because the determination requires
an empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with
accuracy.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616-17 (1995) (Breyer, I, dissenting).
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